



Wilhelm Dietl  
 
Abstract: This is a revised lecture, which the author held 
at the “Conference on “Cryptography & 
Intelligence”/”Secret of Ciphers” in Prag, June 1, 2011. 
The author was recruited by the German Foreign 
Intelligence Service, BND, to work as a secret service 
member under the cover of his journalistic work. He gave 
some insight into the character of the BND´s Middle East 
operations in the 1980s and early 1990s, into some of the 
practical day-to-day activities of secret service work and 
wrote about some of his missions in the Middle East. Of 
course, he is writing from his personal experience about 
this divided professional life.And, of course, about the 
basic interaction between intelligence organizations, 
open reporting and public awareness.  
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Bundesnachrishtendienst (BND) 
In the course of my life, twice I got very close to the German 
Foreign Intelligence Service – the Bundesnachrichtendienst 
or BND. First, there was that huge authority, recognizable 









































unknown something for the majority of the German 
population. During that time foreign countries still knew less 
about the German Foreign Intelligence Service, This was 
o.k., as the organisation worked as a secret service and was 
supposed to find out everything beyond the borders being 
necessary for the security of the old Federal Republic. 
In the early years of the BND everything had to be tuned 
with the American friends, later – appropriate to the 
respective historical times -  with European partners or 
possible new confidents; Israelis, for example. The Foreign 
Intelligence Service was no domestic state security service. 
If it was looking after Germans during that times, there was 
always a massive international connection, and of course a 
political in addition. 
This mysterious establishment, sitting for decades 
behind high walls in the Munich noble suburb of Pullach, to 
the public was not existent at all. Under normal 
circumstances, none of its employees ever should refer to it. 
If ever a curious question concerning their job emerged, 
they’d have to murmur something about the Federal 
Administration of Properties or so. No one was allowed to 
speak about further details without need. 
Each employee was – in the case of someone asking 
about his or her job - supposed to change the subject or in 
very extreme cases leave the asking person in the rain. No 
stranger was allowed to find out something about our 
Foreign Intelligence Service. Thus also was inculcated upon 
me the day I signed up. This was the rule. We did not offend 
against our rules because it could have endangered the 
whole job and with it our very own existences, of colleagues 
and informants. Conspiracy was everything, very confidential 
gathering of data in the name and order of the Federal 
Republic the aim. 
If we would have been an organization like many others, 
we could have adopted the CIA definition of intelligence, 
because it sounds so harmless:  
“Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge 
and foreknowledge of the world around us. The prelude 
to decision and action by …. policymakers. Intelligence 
organizations provide this information in a fashion that 
helps consumers, either civilian leaders or military 
commanders, to consider alternative options and 
outcomes. The intelligence process involves the 
painstaking and generally tedious collection of facts, 
their analysis, quick and clear evaluations, production of 
intelligence assessments, and their timely dissemination 





















I rigorous, timely, and relevant to policy needs and 
concerns.” 
We understood this to be honorable – and important. We 
did back up the "store" how we trivialized the Foreign 
Intelligence Service ironically (and for our own privacy it was 
an anonymous term), and the service backed us up. We 
lived in this scenery of feelings, at least during that certain 
time which today seems so awfully far away. Why and how 
still has to be explained without praising the corps mind of 
the Old Boy Network as only true. 
Meeting the BND personal 
But let’s go back to the year 1982. I had given up safety of 
an editor's contract with the weekly magazine QUICK long 
ago and had exchanged for a book contract with Droemer 
Knaur Publishers. For this, I travelled quite intensely to Near 
and Middle Eastern countries, investigated and researched 
about “Secret commandos of Islam“. Thus later being the 
subtitle of the book „Holy War”. Of course, the BND was 
aware of that and not later as I did request journalistic 
background talks referring sensitive regions at their public 
relations office in Pullach, I was not to be overlooked any 
more. After I’d ride some daredevil actions, for example the 
one in the Syrian city of Hama where the Assad regime just 
had survived an Islamic coup, BND’s friendly spokesman 
contacted me, asking whether I could imagine to carry out a 
non-journalistic background conversation with his Near and 
Middle East colleagues. Well, I did not only imagine, I went 
for it. 
The first meeting took place at Sheraton Hotels & 
Towers in Munich-Bogenhausen. Undiluted and pure 
casting. Two future colleagues tried to get to know me, 
through listening. About Hama. How I did get in and out 
alive, from my experiences and relations in other corners of 
that tinderbox “Middle East”. We spoke about the menu of 
the Italian restaurant at the first floor of the five star Cham 
Hotel in Damascus and about a Syrian airbase which one 
could overlook from a certain spot on the road to Palmyra. 
We also touched quite personal, informal things: My 
activities during ten long years as a journalist, my visions for 
the future. Both "auditors" wanted to know, why I would turn 
my back just now to a well paid employment and how would 
loyalty look like in case of confidential activity. 
„Can you imagine receiving information, reporting and 









































get to know would also be of great interest and use to 
you as a journalist?”  
Would wandering on the narrow ridge between both jobs 
and two separate existences be applicable for me?  
“You must understand that you never ever will be able to 
open up about whatever your job would be at the Foreign 
Intelligence Service. No outsider may get to know about it 
or suspect. This is for your own good and very own 
interest.“ 
Responses must have been positive to the two officers 
as the unusual meeting concluded very cordially and a 
further second round was supposed to take place within 
days. For me, everything was clear. My interests where 
about the Near and Middle East. The BND would crisis-proof 
bolster me for this specialization. There were no questions of 
ethics and morality as it is raised today again and again. It 
was a regular employer-employee relationship and after all – 
this aspect always is embezzled – it served West German 
security. 
Working for the BND 
It should last weeks and several detailed meetings, until the 
frame of a future cooperation was recognizable. My new 
partners were part of Department 16A, responsible for 
intelligence in the Near East. The department was led by an 
old warhorse called Cornelis Hausleiter, who mostly 
appeared  at the Pullach headquarters with his fictitious 
name Carl Hagemann – at some opportunities as well as 
Bernhard Fischer or Curt Hausmann – and who was a man 
of the very first hour. 
I had never before heard about Cornelis Hausleiter, as 
he had avoided all headlines and so far nobody ever talked 
about him. During those times the Bundesnachrichtendienst 
did not provide an endless chain of scandals and headlines; 
behind the high walls of the old Nazi camp "Nikolaus" a 
really sworn in community lived in the elegant south of 
Munich. At that time the cold war had just reached its climax. 
Absolute secrecy was the most important duty. We took this 
unconditional serious and did stick to it.  
This was one of the reasons why it took me quite some 
time to understand that the abbreviation “16A” stood for a 
quite small unusual squad. It was composed from die-hard 
civilians, also former armed forces and daredevils in the best 





















I Service did not see any problem in coaching Gaddafis body 
guards and others being devoted to development and 
distribution of complex security technology. 16A, also this I 
learned step by step, with pleasure explored own ways, 
those not always being really transparent to the Pullach 
hierarchy higher officials. 
Therefore, Hausleiters men also received unusual orders 
and assignments with Near and Middle East not even being 
a camouflage. 16A again and again served as a sort of fire 
brigade, and its employees very well controlled the art of 
alarm take-offs. Very often we departed because political 
arsonists in the widest sense had already started their 
business, or cause we expected somewhere in our area of 
interest a major wildfire to inflame. 
16A stood in absolute contrast to boring rituals at other 
departments where they fiddled for days in order to just 
organize a simple official trip. 16A, were the practical people, 
reason for success of my ten years and eight months as a 
member at the BND. 
I still lacked numerous tips for daily life every newcomer 
was supplied with, orders and bans, knowledge of the 
organisations´ own language which consists of many 
abbreviations. Conspiracy was important, the lasting firewall 
against friends and even family. Everybody was to believe 
that I was operating my numerous trips to more and more 
exotic places as part of my already most busy journalists life. 
I had to carry on my normal and usual professional 
duties, should not spend a lot of cash of unexplainable origin 
or give speeches about my „new possibilities“. Nobody 
should be aware or should think of a sudden change. This 
was not really easy as all transactions of the BND were 
exclusively executed in cash. Travel expenses were paid in 
advance and after my return complete accounts and fees 
were to be settled in cash.  
My favorite position was the so-called "activity fund". 180 
German Marks per day provided for all times solvency and 
the moneys use did not have to be specified afterwards. Of 
course I did pay off my resources (informants) in cash. Later, 
as the mighty machinery was moving more or less by itself, I 
was allowed to transfer money to my informants abroad. The 
given reasons for the payment were absolutely harmless of 
course and delusive for outsiders. It could be for instance, 
that I paid debts out of a shipment to an Arabian importer of 
the glass manufacturer Swarowski in Austria. The 










































The work itself did not offer any surprises. I researched 
and investigated as I would have done as a journalist. 
During those times in journalism the bar was set for 
Investigation and the job itself was not at all so far from 
everyday procurement of Secret Services. Only, at the BND 
without exception, only very specific and mostly top secret 
details were interest.  
Which real journalist would have tried to get the manual 
of the new MiG-29 in order to write an article series about it? 
Or even print the booklet as a facsimile. Who would ever 
want to publish the conspiratorial procured travel data of a 
possibly quite dangerous Lebanese in his newspaper? The 
secret service job was similar to journalism, and 
nevertheless, in many ways completely different. 
Of course a meeting in a foreign town, being the very 
first meeting with a new informant or a not so well known 
informant, made me think of suitable safety measures. I 
used to arrive one or two days in advance, hanging around, 
getting to know places and orbiting the later point of 
meeting, taking a close look at entrances and exits, 
underground parking, possible escape routes as well as 
access roads. In most cases meetings took place in a hotel 
or a restaurant. For safety reasons and as a rule, I did stay 
at another hotel. In no case I was hazardous or was to leave 
the lead role to others – by any means I did have to remain 
in charge for whatever was to happen. Only in very special 
occasions I was willing  to change the meeting point on short 
telephone notice – a tactical method by secret services to be 
able to determine further developments. 
During all my intelligence trips I did very much pay 
attention not to carry out well-worn rituals. In case I did 
announce my arrival with the 6 p.m. plane, I’d already arrive 
at noon, I did never use the direct road to the meeting place, 
most times a wide detour took me there. I’d not use a taxi, 
but the underground. I abandoned possible pursuers, 
crossing a department store, the underground parking of a 
hotel, sneaking in at on one side, out at the other, or used 
the multiple possibilities of a railway station or the labyrinth 
of a big company where no one knew me. Only if I had made 
sure that nobody followed, I headed for my real destination, 
acting similar on my way back.  
In the BND there was no "Q" like the one we know from 
the Bond movies. No head of a research or developing 
department appeared before starting an official trip 
presenting new technical gadgets. I remember only two 
opportunities where I received some appliances. After an 





















I Cyprus and wrote a long report for headquarters.  I then 
used the early version of a relatively small laptop with a 
separate modem supposedly developed by our own 
technicians. The modem encoded my texts. Later they told 
me that everything had worked out fine.  
For emergency cases I received an old fashioned note 
pad with paper sheets whose pages would resolve 
automatically while contacting water. In seconds the snow-
white sheet of paper became a milky sludge which one had 
to rinse down the sink. Nobody ever would be able to put the 
contents together. The process itself seemed to be a magic 
trick. 
There was some more distinction between us and James 
Bond or Jack Ryan: BND agents don´t use hand guns, no 
weapons at all. We collected informations with pencil and 
ballpoint pen; in rather rare cases with recording devices 
and cameras. No doubt about it: Having a choice, we 
preferred complete files and official documents. Paper is 
heavy stuff, so sometimes I could hardly carry the material. 
These years, there was no USB stick, no flash drive, not 
even a notebook available. 
In summer of 1982 the commodity “news” for me 
suddenly had a new quality. Also this fact prevented me 
from mixing up both occupations. Quite clear, I was able to 
see the border between media and intelligence service and 
adjusted myself to it. I did not have or get any problems as I 
carried out both activities exclusively and professionally. The 
BND became my most important assignment. When I knew 
the inside of the institution, it disenchanted itself. Never ever 
I showed temptations acting as sort of 007. Anyhow, my 
regional fields of work didn´t really provide us with Bond girls 
or even lookalikes. 
The German Foreign Intelligence Service was and is a 
hardly flexible bureaucracy where the limitations of daily 
office hours and surcharges for official trips play an 
immensely important role. At least during my time pencils 
were substituted by an artificial lengthener so that they could 
be used up to the last centimeter. And, moreover: Von der 
Wiege bis zur Bahre – Formulare, Formulare, Formulare. In 
English it doesn´t rhyme: From the cradle up to the stretcher 
– forms, forms, forms. This is a basic proverb in the BND 
community. A guideline through the official tracks of Pullach 
– and today of Berlin.  
Fortunately, I dealt with it only a little. I avoided the 
paper trail, because my handlers took care of it. I had to 
concentrate exclusively on the procurement of information, 









































was exhausting enough. From the early Eighties into the 
Nineties I was working  for the BND under my my real name 
and – internally – under aka "Dali" all over the area of crisis 
between India and  Tunisia. I maintained comprehensive 
contacts with high ranking executives, operatives of 
intelligence services and members of liberation movements.  
No questions about it: In the old days, some of them 
have been our partners, today they are considered to be 
terrorists. One example out of many: Golbuddin 
Hekmatyar, the Afghan warlord. In the Eighties we had lots 
in common with him, today his name is on the same wanted 
list as Bin Ladens. I covered the wars and military 
skirmishes of the Eighties, sometimes from a first row seat.  
The BND was always interested in background and inside 
knowledge of every war theatre, the situation of the 
opponents, their equipment as well as the identity of their 
suppliers. The same old story was repeating itself from 
Afghanistan to Iran and Iraq, from Lebanon down to 
Yemen. 
In addition, I was collecting data on political and 
business developments, military and police secrets, about 
arms trade and drug trafficking – and, of course, 
international terrorism became more and more important for 
us. For years I followed the trail of Carlos and his gang. It 
was a bunch of brutal mercenaries, far away from the fake 
political image they tried to spread.   
I managed to penetrate the organization of the 
Palestinian separatist Abu Nidal. For a while, we were able 
to oversee the travel movements of his operatives. From 
insiders I purchased the real names and personal data of 
many activists, in a number of cases even informations 
about their intentions and aims before they even started to 
travel. According to the internal statistics, I submitted 856 
reports during my cooperation with the BND. In comparison, 
it´s quite a lot.  
For 130 months of cooperation with the 
Bundesnachrichtendienst I received a salary of about 234 
000 Deutschmarks , and 418 000 Marks for the travel 
expenses.  In other words: I made 1800 Deutschmarks a 
month.  This is definitely an amount on which in my social 
sphere nobody can live. Who earns 1800 Marks a month, 
must still have a second job which is paid substantially. 
German press reports which accused me in 2006 of a BND 






















I Work for the BND came to the end 
My liaison with the BND ended in early 1993, being 008 
the reason. This was the nickname of Bernd Schmidbauer. 
The then Minister of State in the Office of the German 
Chancellor. He always smiled when someone called him 
008, as he liked this nickname. Intelligence work was his 
most favorite pastime and so he enjoyed dealing with the 
complicated case of two German hostages in Lebanon. Not 
just Schmidbauer, many colleagues from the BND were 
busy with it. Myself, I was involved in all the German 
hostage cases between the years 1987 to 1992. 
What was the background? Some of you might know, 
that two members of the Lebanese Shiite Hamadi clan had 
been arrested at Frankfurt Airport because of their 
involvement in terrorist acts. In return, the Hamadis 
kidnapped Germans in order to exchange them for their 
relatives. In the Eighties Lebanon was a real hotspot for 
abductions. Through mediation of the United Nations in June 
1992 the very last hostages have been released after 1128 
days of captivity. Their names: Heinrich Strübig and 
Thomas Kemptner. Minister Schmidbauer being involved in 
the case only since the end of 1991 travelled to Beirut in 
order to accompany them back home to Germany. 
The ambitious Politician took his chance to put himself in 
the spotlight, so the rest of the world would have to believe 
in him as the “rescuer”.  He never rectified this impression 
created by the media, instead quite enjoyed the image of 
being a hero. Even Germany´s daily “Süddeutsche Zeitung” 
being considered critical, which had earlier on published 
impertinently that hostages would “not be freed because of 
Schmidbauer, but in spite of him”  now helped creating and 
keeping the fairy tale alive: Schmidbauer accomplished „the 
release of German hostages in Lebanon“ 
Already in summer 1992 grumbling went through BND-
rows. Some old hands who had worked for years on a 
positive outcome and solution for the kidnapped Germans, 
saw such headlines with astonishment. They rejected 
Schmidbauers strategy, that all success would be for the 
politicians, for the chancellor's office, better understood for 
the chancellors party, the CDU. No doubt, Schmidbauer was 
the coordinator of the Federal Intelligence Services, this 
giving him the power to act the way he did. If his behavior 
was ethical and morally correct, is a different issue. 
A short period of time later I did attend an international 
terrorism conference that took place in Budapest. I was 









































based Institute of Terrorism Research and because I had 
published several essays concerning this topic. Official 
discussions included how Germany had dealt with the 
problem of hostages in Lebanon. Schmidbauers “heroism” 
concerning this issue was made a subject and openly 
celebrated. 
I was very much afraid that this untrue version would in 
effect become a true fact for the experts of the conference. I 
had my say and in a short statement I tried to explain the 
background of the misunderstanding, Schmidbauer had 
"liberated the kidnapped NGO-workers”. 
My Budapest remarks immediately was teared to shreds 
by the keepers of BND-internal political correctness, 
heralding the beginning of the end of my cooperation with 
BND, which did not hit me as a stroke of fate as it was 
predictable for me. 
My nerves were on edge already for long, as often I did 
have to learn that increasingly my own and personal security 
during extreme and dangerous activities for BND was only of 
low importance. 
Already, in the Middle East I experienced growing 
mistrust during meetings with local officials. Did other 
services start to investigate about me; did they check any 
concrete suspicions against me? In theory a plausible denial 
is always ready, but let it become a life threatening 
situation…. I was not keen to experience it. 
These days Pullach wasn’t much more but the automatic 
execution of acquisition missions. The cordial warmth, the 
informal familiar atmosphere of the early years, which had 
been above all the base of confidence had disappeared with 
colleagues and liaison officers the day they had retired. 
In case an operation ended successful, this achievement 
would be taken over sooner or later from other departments 
scoring for it. We were only a cog in the machinery and the 
caravan moved on. 
X-Mas time 1992 as usual was very busy, this being the 
reason that “divorce” wasn’t to be executed still in the old 
year. Then in 1993 the separation – ironically at the same 
spot where we met the very first time, at Munich Sheraton – 
was formalized. A deputy director of department I read the 
security advice. He told me, to be absolutely discrete 
concerning all matters during my years with BND. He listed 
half a dozen countries which for security reason I should not 
visit during the near future. 
An important period of my life had found its conclusion. 
Many years later, after my cover was blown by the BND 





















I for me, an unusual one. Most of the media was very hostile 
and so I had to defend myself continuously.  
Let´s get back to the chronology. After leaving the BND, 
I became a fulltime journalist, again. From 1993 until 2004 I 
worked for a newsmagazine, called FOCUS. Of course, I 
became an expert on security matters, whatever that is. In 
some of my articles I was critical of my former employer, but 
in a constructive way. 1997 I wrote a book about the 
German hostages in Lebanon, the seven year long 
international affair I was very much involved for the BND.  
„Bedingt dienstbereit“ – how the problems had began 
My real troubles began in 2004 when Norbert Juretzko, 
a former BND case officer, and I published a common book 
about the organization. It´s title translates roughly into 
“Limited readiness”/Bedingt dienstbereit. In his 
clandestine work, Juretzko hat utilized many senior sources, 
particular Russian army officers following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. He befriended himself with quite a number of 
Russian officers who were about to leave their barracks in 
East Germany in order to go back home. Everything was for 
sale then, from the Russian army. Arms, documents, state 
secrets. Juretzko was very successful in his work.  
One day, Juretzko received documents which contained 
clear hints that Volker Foertsch, one of our most senior 
superiors, was a double agent, working for the KGB as well. 
The BND and the Federal Prosecution Office in Karlsruhe 
set up secret commissions of inquiry, which not only 
rebuffed his allegations but accused him of disseminating 
false information, fabricating intelligence reports, extracting 
money fraudulently and falsely accusing his colleagues. 
Juretzko was tried behind closed doors, found guilty of 
some of the offenses and given an 11-month-suspended 
sentence. Juretzkos revenge was a book co-authored with 
me.  
The BND tried to prevent the book by all means, some of 
them quite illegal and unlawful. The intelligence service 
always had an eye on us. One of these days, the BND 
decided to take personal revenge by including me in an 
already ongoing scandal. They added my name to a list of 
journalists who spied on their colleagues in the service of the 
BND.  
My response was a book about my real work in the 
Middle East and the work with the BND as a secret service. 









































filed a complaint against the former President of the BND, 
August Hanning, and his successor Ernst Uhrlau, for 
disclosure of state secrets, revealing my name as a former 
employee of the organization. According to German laws, it 
is a crime uncovering an intelligence official. Both cases 
were rejected. They never reached court.  
I went to court with some of the media, sueing them for 
libel. The results were mixed and awfully expensive, but for 
my own peace of mind I had to go through these trials. But 
the damage was already done, mainly on my side. 
Intelligence services and the journalists 
 Israeli author Yossi Melman from the well-known 
newspaper “Haaretz” – a leading expert on intelligence 
matters - was asking David Halevy, one of the elder 
statesman of journalism, for a comment. We know each 
other for approximately 25 years, but I had never told him 
about my intelligence past. Let me quote his statement:  
“From the viewpoint of a journalist who covered and 
rubbed elbows with espionage agencies, a journalist is 
always into trading – give me and take from me”. 
Halevy says.  
“The boundary between journalism and espionage is very 
blurred, and it´s almost impossible to define when you 
are engaged in one or the other, so that a journalist who 
works for an espionage service does not surprise me. 
The fact that Willy was a journalist and hat journalistic 
skills and experience aided his ability as an intelligence 
man. It´s the ability to cross borders, to wander about in 
the world and obtain legitimacy to collect information and 
recruit people. Journalists can approach sources without 
arousing suspicion. A journalist can pay for information 
and it looks natural.” 
“Haaretz” was asking me for comment:  
“What does Dietl think about the possible implications of 
his spying for the security of journalists in regions of 
conflict?”  
My answer was:  
“Today, in many areas of tension in the world, the 
belligerent sides are suspicious of journalists. It was 
different in my time. Times have changed. The reason is 





















I in the guise of journalists. They are amateur spies 
posturing as journalists. I was a real journalist. The 
problem lies in the `dosage´. In my time there were very 
few journalists who operated as I did, so there was less 
danger, both for us and in terms of not endangering other 
journalists. I am proud of what I did. I acted out of belief 
in values and ideals. By my actions I exposed dangerous 
terrorists, thwarted their operations and saved human 
lives. I have no need to apologize.”  
Interestingly, the media outside Germany was always 
objective and open on this subject. They did not join the 
strong efforts of others to ruin my reputation.  
And, whenever I achieved one of the rare victories in the 
courthouse or somebody spoke in my favour, the media 
showed extremely low profile or neglected it altogether. 
There is a basic law: Whatever is printed, should not be 
reversed, even if it´s a proven lie or simply disinformation. 
So it went when I sued the BND because of his observation 
activities over the years. On July 20, 2011, we met in a 
Munich court. From the first minute, the “other side” 
encouraged an arrangement. They didn´t want to discuss 
the case in public. Finally the BND commited itself to 7500 
Euros of smart-money (Schmerzensgeld) and took care of 
the court fees. That was that. The core of the dispute is still 
to be solved – the false accusations of 2006, the high 
treason the BND commited on me and other former 
collaborators.  
 
